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An economic survey of the commercial operators currently active in the Queensland Coral Reef Fin-Fish
Fishery has been carried out, as part of a research project aimed at evaluating alternative management
options for this ﬁshery. This paper presents the background analysis used as a basis to develop the
sampling design for this survey. The background analysis focuses on activity patterns of the ﬂeet based
on effort and catch information, as well as patterns of quota ownership. Based on this information, a
ﬁshing business proﬁle describing the micro-economic structure of ﬁshing operations is developed. This
proﬁle, in conjunction with the qualitative information gained in undertaking the economic surveys,
allows preliminary understanding of the key drivers of proﬁtability in the CRFFF, and possible impacts of
external factors on ﬁshing operations.
Crown Copyright & 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Decision-support tools used to assist in the evaluation of alter-
native ﬁsheries management strategies increasingly seek to include
the dynamic response of ﬁshing operators to changes in their
economic, ecological and/or regulatory circumstances [1,2]. This is
because consideration of such responses may be critical in assessing
the likely ecological, economic and social consequences of alternative
management options [3–6], as well as of externally driven shocks
such as climatic events [7]. In the ﬁsheries modeling literature, as in
the broader domain of ﬁsheries research and policy analysis, the
operators involved in commercial ﬁshing are often referred to as
“Fishermen” or “Fishers”, with limited to no further speciﬁcation.
This is particularly true in the ﬁsheries economics literature, as
illustrated by Gordon's seminal work on developing a bio-economic
theory of ﬁsheries production dynamics [8], and the large body of
research that developed on this basis. Since this research is con-
cerned with the description of economic decisions made by13 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rcommercial enterprises harvesting marine living resources, there
has been a tendency to identify these enterprises with individual
people involved in the business of ﬁshing. To some extent, this may
be justiﬁed by the fact that a large proportion of the world's
commercial ﬁshing activities are carried out by businesses that are
held and operated by a single person, who owns and operates a
single ﬁshing vessel—the classic “owner-operator” ﬁsher. However,
there are also many cases in which the structure of commercial
ﬁshing businesses may be more complex, with multiple and varied
individuals involved in the ownership and operation of ﬁshing assets.
When this is the case, commercial entities cannot be identiﬁed with
particular individuals. In addition, such identiﬁcation may be mis-
leading as to the nature of the incentives and economic risks which
businesses face, as these will depend on their business structure.
This is particularly an issue if the aim of the research or policy
analysis is to understand, and possibly inﬂuence, the incentives to
which commercial ﬁshing operations respond.
This paper presents an analysis of this issue using the Coral
Reef Fin-Fish Fishery (CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef as a case
study. The Effects of Line Fishing Simulator (ELFSim) was devel-
oped to examine potential management strategies for the CRFFF
[9,10]. ELFSim simulates the populations of coral trout (CT) andights reserved.
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model captures the spatial complexity of ﬁsh larval movement on
the ocean currents, and the size, age and sex structure of the
species across the region. In addition, ELFSim also simulates the
ﬁshing activity of commercial ﬁshing operations across the region,
as well as the charter and recreational components of the ﬁshery.
The platform contains an explicit representation of the behavior of
commercial ﬁshing operators, represented as individual, proﬁt-
maximizing agents. This includes ﬁshing effort, its spatial and
temporal distribution, as well as catch quota trading. This compo-
nent of the model was developed and calibrated using economic
data from the 1990s. At the time, the ﬁshery was experiencing a
transition from the landing of mostly dead ﬁsh, to the landing of
both live and dead ﬁsh, the former attracting much higher prices.
In mid 2004 the ﬁshery also transitioned from a regulatory
system based on input controls, to a mixed system that includes
total allowable commercial catch limits and individual transfer-
able quotas (ITQs), input restrictions, and increased marine
reserves [11].
These changes led to the need for and a ﬁshing industry request
to update the economic description of the ﬁshery to be included in
the simulation platform. This paper presents the approach taken to
collect this information and the background analysis of the
industry that was developed in the process. This involved identify-
ing types of ﬁshing businesses with similar characteristics actively
involved in the ﬁshery in the 2010–11 ﬁnancial year, as well as a
preliminary analysis of the structure of quota ownership in the
CRFFF. This background analysis, as well as a preliminary under-
standing of the economics of the ﬁshery derived from discussions
with stakeholders in the process of deﬁning the survey approach,
allowed an economic proﬁle of the businesses involved in the
ﬁshery to be determined. This proﬁle, along with qualitative
information obtained in the course of developing it, provides
insights into the diversity of businesses that currently operate in
the ﬁshery, and how this may affect key drivers of proﬁtability in
the ﬁshery at the micro-economic level.1 Based on estimated annual average prices of the different product forms
landed by the ﬁshery.2. The commercial ﬁshery
The Queensland Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery consists of a
commercial component, a recreational component and a charter
component, with a small amount of take by Indigenous ﬁshers
[12]. The commercial ﬂeet, which is the focus of the analysis
presented in this paper, targets a diversity of coral-reef associated
ﬁsh using hand-held lines with baited hooks (4155 species). The
main species by order of decreasing value include several species
of coral trout (Plectropomus and Variola spp., CT), of which
P. Leopardus is predominantly landed as live ﬁsh and exported to
Asia, as well as red-throat emperor (Lethrinus miniatus, RTE) and a
wide range of other reef-associated ﬁsh species (OS) including
other cods (mainly Serranidae), other emperors (Lethrinidae) and
tropical snappers (mainly Lutjanidae), landed as dead whole ﬁsh
or processed as ﬁllets, and sold on the domestic market. The
commercial ﬁshery spans a broad latitudinal range along the Great
Barrier Reef; from Cape York (10141′S) in the north, to Bundaberg
(24130′S) in the south.
The commercial ﬁshery consists of a wide diversity of operations,
from single small vessels ﬁshing short (12 to 48 h) trips, to larger
operations using a mother vessel and a varying number of tender
boats, undertaking trips of up to 2.5 weeks. In addition, ﬁshing
businesses display varying strategies regarding their targeted ﬁshing
effort and catch composition. Some focus solely on CRFFF species, in
particular the landing of live CT, while others target a broader range
of species, outside of the CRFFF, using hook and line as well as other
ﬁshing apparatus (e.g. nets, pots, trawl).The commercial ﬁshery is managed primarily via a range of
input and output controls detailed in the 2003 Coral Reef Fin-Fish
Management Plan [13]. These controls include:1. technical regulations regarding maximum vessel length (20 m),
number of lines per ﬁsher and number of hooks on lines (no
more than 3 ﬁshing lines per ﬁsher at a time, and no more than
six hooks or lures attached to the lines) and minimum and
maximum sizes of ﬁsh;2. limited entry since 1984, through the issue of commercial
ﬁshing licences, which authorise the use of a primary boat
(and identiﬁed tenders), to ﬁsh within the ﬁsheries endorsed
by ﬁshery symbols on the licence. There are currently 369
licences authorised to operate in the CRFFF, of which approxi-
mately two thirds were recorded to be active in recent years
[14]. Symbol endorsements on the licences determine the
regions in which a licence holder is entitled to ﬁsh, as well as
the species which can be caught (the symbol “RQ” allowing
catch of CRFFF species), the ﬁshing techniques, and the max-
imum number of tenders which can be used in the ﬁshing
operation;3. commercial Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Limits. TAC limits were
established in 2004 based on historical catch records. The available
catch entitlements are: CT1 288 t, RTE616 t, and OS956 t;4. allocation of the commercial TAC via individual transferable
quota units (ITQs). The TACs were allocated as line units to
individual licence holders in 2004 on the basis of 1 unit¼1 kg
(whole weight) of allowable landings of a particular species
group. These entitlements are valid only if its owner also holds
an RQ symbol that is in force for that particular year. A number
of rules also apply to landings including designated landing
points and prior notice of landing. Additional regulations also
apply to the ﬁlleting of ﬁsh prior to landing;5. tradability of both input and output entitlements. Licences can
be permanently sold or temporarily leased; ﬁshery symbols can
be transferred between licences; and individual line units can
also be sold or leased between RQ symbols; and6. seasonal spawning closures (currently two 5-day closures in
October and November).
In addition, the ﬂeet predominantly operates in the area
covered by Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) Zoning Plan
2003. Approximately 33% of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
comprises no-take marine reserves and the ﬁshery is required to
operate outside of these reserve areas.
In 2010–11, total landings by the ﬁshery amounted to approxi-
mately 1600 t and estimated total gross returns of approximately
$44 million1 . This was composed of 763 t of live CT (49% of total
RQ landings) and 115 t of dead CT, live CT generating the greatest
share (81%) of total gross returns from the ﬁshery ($36 million, see
Fig. 1) due to the much higher ﬁrst sale price of this product
category ($47/kg on average). With lower average sale prices
(around $10/kg for RTE and $7/kg for OS), landings of these species
which represented approximately 43% of total landings led to an
estimated gross return of approximately $5.6 million, or less than
13% of the total returns from the ﬁshery (Fig. 1).
The ﬁshery has undergone signiﬁcant changes since the intro-
duction of the Fisheries (Coral Reef Fin-Fish) Management Plan 2003
and its associated management, and the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Zoning Plan 2003 (Zoning Plan). ~136 t of CT, ~75 t of RTE and
~109 t of OS quota and 45 associated RQ symbols were bought
out in a structural adjustment package associated with the
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initial increase in catch rates and landings of CT up to a peak in
2008–2009 where the entire TAC for these species was nearly
landed. This was followed by a drop in catch rates, that operators
in the ﬁshery largely attributed to the ecological impacts of
Cyclones Hamish (March 2009) and Yasi (February 2011), which
led to a signiﬁcant drop in ﬁshing effort and catches in recent
years (Fig. 2).
This recent trend in the ﬁshery has been reﬂected in the value
of CRFFF access rights, in particular for quota units. Fig. 3 reports
the advertised nominal prices for CT quota sales and leases as
observed in a specialized commercial ﬁshing magazine (Queens-
land Fisherman) between January 2006 and December 2007, after
the TACs were introduced (i.e. in the booming period of the CT
ﬁshery), and in the same magazine and quota broker web sites for
months August 2011 to February 2012 and October 2012 to
February 20132 . While the lowest prices observed in the booming
period were reportedly around $45/unit to $50/unit for sales and
$3 to $4 for leases, sale prices as low as $11/unit and lease prices as
low as $1/unit were recorded in 20123, with a large variability in
advertised prices.2 Quota sale and lease prices are not recorded by the management system.
3 In July 2012, sale prices as low as $11/CT unit were reported by an industry
member in an ABC radio program. In February 2013 an advert was seen offering to
pay $9/kg for the purchase of CT quota.3. Approach
The focus for the survey was the ﬁnancial year 2010–11. The
research team followed an approach which has been successfully
applied in a variety of contexts, including French [15,16] and
English [17] commercial ﬁsheries. This involved producing an
updated description of the industry and developing a business
proﬁle taking into account the size and nature of ﬁshing opera-
tions. The business proﬁle was then used as a basis for a stratiﬁed
random sampling of ﬁshing operations, taking into account the
coastal regions fromwhich vessels operate4 . Vessel owners and/or
owner operators of the sampled vessels were interviewed face-to-
face, using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was
initially developed using the authors’ background knowledge with
respect to the collection of economic data in a range of Australian,
as well as European ﬁsheries (Table 1). It contained three main
components on (i) vessel activity in the year under consideration;
(ii) costs and earnings associated with the operation of the ﬁshing
vessel; and (iii) a broader set of questions regarding the history of
the respondent's involvement in the CRFFF, as well as current
perceived key drivers of proﬁtability and possible responses to
changes in catch rates in the areas usually ﬁshed. The survey
approach was ﬁnalized in close collaboration with active4 In addition, the ﬂeet proﬁle was used as a basis to allocate surveys of
voluntary participants, who contacted the survey team, to the strata in the sample.
Table 1
Previous economic surveys of commercial ﬁsheries which were used to deﬁne the structure of the questionnaire applied to the CRFFF.
Fishery surveyed Country/Region Organization Years for which data
was collected
Moreton Bay Otter Trawl Moreton Bay, QLD, Australia Queensland Department of Employment, Economic
Development and Innovation
2010
Marine Scaleﬁsh Fishery South Australia EconSearch Pty Ltd 2009–10
Eastern Tuna and Billﬁsh Fishery & Southern and Eastern
ScaleFish and Shark Fishery
Commonwealth, Australia Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics
2007–08 and 2008–09
Queensland commercial ﬁsheries Queensland, Australia Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2007/08
Reef line ﬁshery (Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery) Queensland, Australia James Cook University 1994–1999
French ﬁshing ﬂeet France Institut Francais de Recherche pour l′Exploitation de la
Mer
2000–2010
UK Fishing ﬂeet UK Seaﬁsh 2001
English Channel ﬁshing ﬂeet UK University of Portsmouth 1995–95, 1997
North Sea beam trawlers North Sea University of Portsmouth 1990–2004
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Queensland and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority.5
3.1. Deﬁnition of a Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery business proﬁle
The target population for the survey was deﬁned as the owners
or owner-operators of vessels that were actively involved in the
CRFFF in 2010–11. In collaboration with Fisheries Queensland, an
initial list of vessels identiﬁed by their boat marks was created,
based on the vessels that held an RQ symbol on their ﬁshing
licence in 2010–11. This list contained 369 individual boat marks,
for which individual vessel technical characteristics, total ﬁshing
effort and its distribution across RQ and non-RQ ﬁshing, annual
landings information from logbooks and total unloads of RQ
species from the quota monitoring system were recorded.
Approximately a third (115) of the boat marks selected through
this initial process were inactive in the reference year (2010–11),
so were excluded from the population frame. Another 41 vessels
had no unloads of RQ species recorded for the reference year (i.e.
had not ﬁshed in the CRFFF in 2010–11), so were also excluded.
This led to a remaining list of 213 vessels for which all technical,
effort and landings information was available, and which had
landed some RQ species in the reference year.
Identiﬁcation of groups of ﬁshing businesses with similar
vessel characteristics and activity proﬁles was based on a cluster
analysis. This used information available to describe vessel char-
acteristics (length, breadth, draft, engine power, number of ten-
ders), as well as characteristics of the businesses’ ﬁshing activity
including landings by ﬁshing method, proportion of CT landed live,
and effort in days ﬁshed which was categorized into total effort,
effort devoted to ﬁshing in the CRFFF, and effort devoted to ﬁshing
in other ﬁsheries. Symbol endorsements held, which determine
the ability for ﬁshing businesses to access and utilize different
ﬁsheries/areas), were included as descriptive variables of the
ﬁshing business groups identiﬁed in the cluster analysis.
The hclust hierarchical cluster analysis function in R was used
to identify ﬁshing business groups displaying similar character-
istics. hclust relies on the speciﬁcation of a dissimilarity function
between observations (Euclidean distance was chosen for the
purpose of this analysis), and uses these distances to iteratively
aggregate individuals into a hierarchical set of clusters [18]. Visual
evaluation of the dendogram presenting the hierarchy of clusters5 The survey was administered between November 2011 and June 2012. The
data collected was anonymized and entered into a database via a dedicated data
entry tool. At the time of writing of this paper, analysis of the data collected was
still underway.was used to identify an appropriate number of business groups
within the ﬁshery. Given that the objective of the analysis was to
establish ﬁshing business groups with homogeneous characteris-
tics, and the need to further allocate these into main regions of the
Queensland coast that would be surveyed6 (Fig. 4), a smaller
number of clusters was favored.4. Results
4.1. Activity proﬁles
Analyses led to the identiﬁcation of three distinct groups of
ﬁshing businesses (Table 2) which comprised differing vessel
speciﬁcations and levels and types of ﬁshing activity (Fig. 5). The
groups were used as a basis to deﬁne a stratiﬁed random sample of
ﬁshing business operators to interview, taking into account the
regional distribution of these three groups.
Overall, the ﬁshing business proﬁle led to the clear differentia-
tion of (i) a large group of Generalist Line Fishers, operating
smaller vessels, many of whom were only very partially active in
2010–11, relatively focused on line ﬁshing but only partially
focused on CRFFF catch; (ii) a group of Dedicated live CT ﬁshers,
operating larger vessels and focused on live CT catch, and con-
tributing to three quarters of the total harvest from the CRFFF, and
(iii) a group of Diversiﬁed ﬁshers operating medium-sized vessels
that operate across a range of ﬁsheries including the CRFFF, which
provides a small share of their total harvest, and whose RQ harvest
only represents a small proportion of the total RQ harvest.
The ﬁrst group (Generalist Line Fishers) comprised the largest
number of ﬁshing businesses (133). These generally utilized
smaller average size vessels, and had lower average levels of
ﬁshing activity in 2010–11 (Fig. 5). They mainly landed line-
caught species, both from the CRFFF and from other ﬁsheries,
although some net-caught ﬁsh was also landed. The greatest share
of CT landing by this group was composed of dead ﬁsh. Altogether,
while representing a large number of ﬁshing businesses, this
group only contributed to 20% of the total unloads of RQ species.
The second group (Dedicated live CT ﬁshers) comprised a
relatively smaller number of ﬁshing businesses (56), utilizing
vessels of larger than average size and supporting a larger number
of tenders. These ﬁshing businesses had much higher levels of6 The deﬁnition of these regions was based on previous studies of the CRFFF,
including the Effects of Line Fishing project, expert knowledge of the key
stakeholders consulted while developing the approach, and existing information
on the spatial distribution of landings by the ﬂeet along the coast.
Fig. 4. Seven regions used to structure the CRFFF economic survey (Large font:
Region, Small font: main landing sites per region, Shapes represent link between
landing sites and regions).
Table 2
Technical characteristics of vessels comprising each ﬁshing business group.
Fishing
business
group
Number
of vessels
Average
length
(m)*
Average engine
power (kw)*
Average number of
tenders per vessel*
1—Generalist
line ﬁshers
133 8.6 (2.4) 143.5 (83.9) 1.3 (1.1)
2—Dedicated
live CT ﬁshers
56 14.5 (2.7) 175.5 (88.3) 4.5 (1.3)
3—Diversiﬁed
ﬁshers
24 9.9 (2.7) 164.9 (93.2) 1.3 (1.4)
Grand total 213 10.3 (3.6) 154.1 (87.3) 2.1 (1.9)
n Standard deviations in brackets; Source: own calculations based on Fisheries
Queensland data.
7 This would seem to indicate the existence of transaction costs on this market
which discourage trades from occurring, despite this leading to costs for quota
owners who decide not to ﬁsh their quota themselves, in terms of both cash costs
(annual administration fees payed on units owned) and opportunity costs of not
leasing their quota out. See [20] for a more detailed analysis of the CT quota market
characteristics.
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ﬁshing and targeted mainly CT. They landed mostly live CT (90% of
all CT harvest) and altogether, this group accounted for 75% of total
landings of RQ species in 2010–11 (Fig 5).
The third group (Diversiﬁed ﬁshers) comprised a small (24)
group of ﬁshing businesses, utilizing medium-sized vessels, oper-
ating in a wide range of ﬁsheries, of which the CRFFF only
constituted a small component in terms of both ﬁshing effort
and landings (Fig 5). This group had levels of activity in 2010–11
that were comparable to those observed for the second group of
businesses. These operators only harvested a small share of the
total landings of RQ species, which constituted on average less
than a quarter of their respective annual harvest, while crab and
net landings represented the largest share. CT landings by these
businesses were mainly dead ﬁsh (80% of all CT harvested was
landed dead).
4.2. Quota ownership
Another important dimension in the characterization of the
CRFFF relates to the structure of quota ownership in the ﬁshery.
The typology developed by Van Putten et al. [19] for the Tasma-
nian rock lobster ﬁshery was used to describe the status of
businesses involved in the quota market for CRFFF species. Thistypology distinguishes between different positions that agents
may have on the quota market, depending on whether they are
actively involved in ﬁshing and/or in ITQ lease trading. The
categories of the Tasmanian Rock Lobster quota market typology
are “investors”, who hold quota which they lease out; “indepen-
dent ﬁshers” who catch the quota they own and do not participate
in the quota market; “income supplementers” who derive income
from both ﬁshing their quota and leasing some out; “lease
dependent” operators who depend on leasing in quota for their
catch; and “quota redistributors” who are involved in both leasing
quota in and leasing quota out. This typology was applied to
ownership and usage of CT quota units in the CRFFF in 2010–11, as
live CT landings were the dominant contributor to the value of
landings in the ﬁshery.
Ownership of CT catch entitlements was distributed across all
of these groups, with investors holding the greatest share (42%) of
total available catch entitlements (Fig. 6). Lease dependent ﬁshers
held only 11% of the available CT quota but harvested more than
two thirds (69%) of the total landed CT in 2010–11. Independent
operators held 12% of total available CT quota and represented a
similar proportion of total landings. The same proportion of CT
quota was held by operators who derived income from both
catching some of their CT quota, and leasing part of it out. A
group of inactive quota owners, who neither leased nor ﬁshed the
quota they owned in 2010–11, was also identiﬁed7.5. Discussion: Key drivers of micro-economic viability in the
ﬁshery
While the analysis of survey results is still underway, this
ﬁshing business proﬁle as well as qualitative information gained in
developing it in collaboration with stakeholders, provides an
understanding of the key drivers of proﬁtability in the CRFFF, as
well as business-level characteristics which may determine how
these drivers affect individual enterprises. A synthetic view of the
drivers of proﬁtability in the CRFFF, based on a standard economic
representation of the ﬁshing business, is presented in Fig. 7. As
illustrated in this ﬁgure, proﬁt is determined by the difference
between the value of a unit of output and the costs of producing
this unit.
Output value is directly inﬂuenced by ﬁrst sale prices, which
are themselves inﬂuenced by a range of factors including the
composition of landings, demand for the different categories of
product landed, as well as exchange rates where the output is
exported. In the case of CT, qualitative information gained in the
process of administering the survey seems to indicate that sale
prices remained relatively high in 2010–11, despite a high Aus-
tralian dollar, probably due to the continued growth in demand for
live ﬁsh in China and relatively low levels of CRFFF CT landings. On
the other hand, prices for dead ﬁsh, particularly for species other
than CT landed by the CRFFF, appear to remain relatively low, due
to the competing supply of imported low-price ﬁsh products on
the Australian domestic market.
Production costs result from the effort required to produce a
unit of output and the unit costs of effort, each of which is also
subject to a range of external inﬂuences. The effort required to
land a unit of ﬁsh (i.e. catch rates) can be inﬂuenced by a
combination of short-term and longer-term environmental and
-5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
nn
ua
l l
an
di
ng
s 
pe
r
 v
es
se
l (
kg
) Beam Trawl
Net
Crab
Line Non-RQ
RQ
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
-
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
A
ve
ra
ge
 p
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 li
ve
 
fis
h 
la
nd
ed
To
ta
l R
Q
 la
nd
in
gs
 b
y 
gr
ou
p,
 2
01
0-
11
 (k
g)
Total RQ landings - Average Proportion of live fish landed
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 v
es
se
ls
 h
ol
di
ng
en
do
rs
em
en
ts
 
Trawl (5-9) Trawl (1,M) SM S N C
-
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f d
ay
s 
fis
hi
ng
 p
er
 v
es
se
l,
20
10
-1
1 
CT days RQ non-CT Days Non RQ Days
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O. Thébaud et al. / Marine Policy 43 (2014) 200–207 205ecological factors. In the case of CT, as already stressed, a pair
of severe cyclones is deemed to have negatively impacted both
ﬁshing opportunities and the catch rates of CT, leading to a
drop in catches in the last three years [21]. Meanwhile, it
would seem that unit costs of ﬁshing have tended to increase,
in particular as a result of increased fuel prices, and the
difﬁculty of maintaining good crew in the presence ofalternative opportunities related to the development of the
Australian mining industry.
Overall, the recent drop in activity and catch in the CRFFF
has largely come from a drop in CT ﬁshing, which resulted from
the combination of environmental and economic drivers
affecting CT catch rates and unit costs of harvesting. This, in
turn, has driven the sale and lease prices of CT quota units
down, as was illustrated in Fig. 3. Additional weaknesses of the
ITQ management system, including practical difﬁculties in
linking landed weights of ﬁsh to quota units, inspection rates
of quota landings and resources for auditing quota and sales
could also have affected quota unit prices. While this qualita-
tive evaluation may apply at the industry level, the actual
consequences of this at the individual business-level may be
quite variable depending on the structure of businesses
involved in the ﬁshery. On the basis of the ﬁshing business
proﬁle described in the previous section, the following main
distinctions can be identiﬁed:
First, the proﬁtability and behavior of businesses centrally
engaged in ﬁshing for live CT (i.e. those belonging to the second
ﬁshing business group in our proﬁle) will be more directly affected
by the circumstances mentioned above, than for operators
who engage in a broader range of ﬁsheries. This is illustrated by
the “level of dependence” box on the right-hand side of Fig. 8.
In particular, operators belonging to the group of Diversiﬁed
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Fig. 8. Drivers of micro-economic proﬁtability depending on business structure (solid (orange) arrows on the horizontal plane reﬂect negative impacts, dashed (green) arrow
reﬂects positive impacts).
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ﬁshery options than the second group, and could be expected to
redirect their effort towards more proﬁtable ﬁsheries (if any) when
returns on CT ﬁshing decrease. On the other hand, effort in the
CRFFF by Diversiﬁed ﬁshers could increase, not because of
improved circumstances in this ﬁshery, but because of degraded
conditions in the alternative sectors in which they are entitled to
operate, hence leading to a weaker correlation between economic
circumstances in the CRFFF, business proﬁtability and ﬁshing
activities for this group. There is an option for CRFFF operators
to shift between the landing of live CT and the landing of dead ﬁsh
of a broader set of species (e.g. OS species). Indeed this option was
exercised in the early years of the live CT ﬁshery of the CRFFF and
was analyzed by [22]. However, given the low sale prices for dead
ﬁsh and the time and costs associated with converting storage
space on board from the handling of live to the handling of chilled/
frozen ﬁsh, this currently does not seem to constitute a viable
option for vessels dedicated to the catch of live CT.
Second, the structure of quota ownership by individual businesses
involved in the ﬁshery may also be crucial in determining the actual
micro-economic impacts of the circumstances recently observed in
the CT component of the ﬁshery. As illustrated in Fig. 8, proﬁtability
of all operators actively involved in ﬁshing will be negatively affected
(orange continuous line arrows) by unfavorable catch rates andharvesting costs. However, not all will be affected to the same
degree; income supplementers will be subjected to both reduced
proﬁtability of their harvests and loss of income from reduced lease
prices. On the other hand, lease dependent ﬁshers, while affected by
the decreased proﬁtability of ﬁshing operations, will beneﬁt from
reduced lease prices, which reduce their operating costs (green
dashed arrow in Fig. 8). Investors, since they only derive income
from leasing out quota, will directly suffer from the reduced lease
prices. Larger investors that invested quite heavily in the ﬁshery are
also likely to be servicing loans against the quota they hold, making a
reduction in lease prices or inability to lease quota out even more
problematic.
Finally, the short-term ﬁnancial viability of ﬁshing operations
also seems to be impacted by the actual set-up of the ﬁshing
business in terms of its catching operations. Qualitative informa-
tion gained in the course of carrying out this research showed
that owner-operators do not always pay themselves a salary for
the time devoted to operating the vessel, particularly when the
economic conditions of operation are difﬁcult. While this may
not be a sustainable solution in the long-term, it provides these
operators with a buffer in periods of low proﬁtability which
businesses who hire skippers to operate their vessels do not have,
as they will need to pay the skipper a salary for him to stay
involved with the business. This characteristic of owner-operated
O. Thébaud et al. / Marine Policy 43 (2014) 200–207 207ﬁshing businesses, illustrated by the box to the right of Fig. 8, is
often encountered in small scale commercial ﬁsheries [23].6. Conclusion
The background analysis of business structures encountered in
the commercial component of the CRFFF conﬁrms that using the
term “Fishers” to describe them all would be misleading, as it
would not adequately reﬂect the diversity in business structures
used to engage in the ﬁshery. Depending on their structure,
different ﬁshing businesses will be impacted differently by exter-
nally driven changes in the factors that affect the proﬁtability of
ﬁshing in the CRFFF, and subsequently their short-term and long-
term economic viability. In turn, this can be expected to affect
incentives for investment to ﬂow towards particular business
structures in the ﬁshery, and for individual businesses to support
alternative approaches aimed at restoring the overall economic
health of the ﬁshery.
Important dimensions deﬁning business structures include
their scale, and the extent to which businesses are specialized or
maintain access to a range of ﬁshing activities or other business
activities which they can shift their ﬁshing effort to. Another
important dimension relates to the structure of asset ownership of
businesses, particularly with regards to access entitlements,
including both licences8 and quota. With the development of
access regulations including licences and quota, access rights have
become a key component of the capital assets required for a
commercial operator to be involved in the ﬁshery. Depending on
their asset ownership structure (i.e. whether they own or lease the
licences and quota they require to operate, and whether they
derive income from these other than through directly ﬁshing),
businesses will not be facing the same risks and will not be
impacted in the same ways by externally driven changes in their
environment. Hence, the same overall changes affecting the ﬁsh-
ery may generate different responses from different businesses,
which may explain the differences in views expressed on future
management of the ﬁshery, particularly as regards the adequate
level of TAC for CT. As stressed by [24], this is still a poorly
understood dimension of investment in ﬁsheries, when it is
becoming a dominant feature in the quota managed ﬁsheries like
the CRFFF, where a combination of access entitlements is required
to commercially harvest ﬁsh.
Finally, it also became apparent in the course of carrying out
this analysis that a key dimension of ﬁshing businesses is whether
the vessels are operated by their owner, or whether they are
operated by a hired skipper. In the latter case, it has been shown
elsewhere that the relevant measure of proﬁtability should be
based on the owner-operator's income, after adequate returns on
investment have been paid [23]. From the qualitative information
available, it appears that owner-operators faced with difﬁcult
conditions such as those recently experienced in the CRFFF can
adjust these returns downwards, at least temporarily, in order to
remain viable. In contrast, businesses that have chosen to operate
with hired skippers are more limited in the adjustments they can
make to skipper remuneration and levels of returns on investment
(i.e. reducing skipper wages will entail a risk of losing competent
skipper and dependent crew).8 Some operators derive income from leasing out a licence. While this may
constitute another important dimension of business structures in the CRFFF, the
data regarding this aspect of the ﬁshery has not been considered in our analysis
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